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Abstract
Falsification may demarcate science from non-science as the
rational way to test the truth of hypotheses. But experimental
evidence from studies of reasoning shows that people often
find falsification difficult. We suggest that domain expertise
may facilitate falsification. We consider new experimental
data about chess experts’ hypothesis testing. The results show
that chess masters were readily able to falsify their plans. They
generated move sequences that falsified their plans more
readily than novice players, who tended to confirm their plans.
The finding that experts in a domain are more likely to falsify
their hypotheses has important implications for the debate
about human rationality.
Hypothesis Testing
People understand everyday and scientific phenomena by
generating hypotheses to explain them. They achieve a true
understanding only by testing hypotheses by searching for
proof. There are two main ways people can test the truth of
their hypotheses. They can either seek confirmation:
evidence that is consistent with a hypothesis, or
falsification: evidence that is inconsistent with a hypothesis.
Falsification is generally considered better than
confirmation: no matter how much evidence is gathered to
confirm a hypothesis, there remains the possibility of
refutation later (Popper, 1959). Confirmation could lead to
the endorsement of untrue ideas and so if people are
rational, they should attempt to falsify their hypotheses.
Many cognitive scientists have interpreted experimental
findings on hypothesis testing within the framework of
falsification (e.g., Wason, 1960). The conclusion has
sometimes been reached that when people fail to attempt to
falsify, they fail to think rationally.
 Early research on hypothesis testing found that people were
prone to a confirmation bias: they tended to search for
confirming evidence and avoid falsifying evidence (e.g.,
Wason, 1960). Confirmation bias has sometimes been
viewed as evidence of human irrationality, for example, it
may lead people to form prejudiced beliefs (e.g., Aronson,
1995). But the idea that human hypothesis testing is
irrational presents a paradox: How can it be flawed given
that it has led to important civil, technological and scientific
discoveries? There are two possible answers: one possibility
is that testing hypotheses through confirmation is more
useful than indicated by a Popperian analysis, and a second
possibility is that people are more capable of falsification
than experimental evidence has revealed so far. We will first
outline the view that confirmation is a useful strategy to test
hypotheses and the view that falsification may be
conceptually impossible (e.g., Poletiek, 1996). Then we will
show that falsification is in fact possible in a domain that
has been a trusted test-bed for theories of cognition for
almost forty years: chess problem solving. We will consider
experimental results that testify to high levels of
falsification in the hypothesis testing of chess masters
(Cowley & Byrne, 2004).
Confirmation: Vice or Virtue?
Irrational hypothesis testing in the form of confirmation bias
was first reported in the 2-4-6 task (Wason, 1960).
Participants in this task are required to discover the rule to
which the number triple 2-4-6 conforms. The participants
are analogous to scientists and the rule is analogous to a law
of nature to be discovered. Participants test their hypotheses
by generating other number triples and they are told by the
experimenter whether each triple conforms to the rule or
not. The rule in the 2-4-6 task is the deliberately general rule
of ‘any ascending numbers’. The salient features of the 2-4-
6 triple tend to induce incorrect hypotheses, for example,
participants tend to focus on its properties of even numbers
and numbers ascending in twos. Participants who generate
these hypotheses, ‘ascending even numbers’ or ‘numbers
ascending in twos’ can discover the real rule ‘any ascending
numbers’ in only one way: by generating triples that falsify
their hypothesis. For example, a participant could try to
falsify the ‘ascending even numbers’ hypothesis by
generating the triple '3-5-7'. They would discover their
hypothesis is false when the experimenter tells them that '3-
5-7' is consistent with the real rule. But participants
overwhelmingly generated confirming triples such as  '10-
12-14'. The triple confirms their hypothesis and it is also
consistent with the real rule and so the experimenter tells
them '10-12-14' is consistent. They announce their incorrect
hypothesis as the rule and fail to solve the task correctly.
 Confirmation bias has been demonstrated many times in the
2-4-6 task and in other related laboratory tasks, for example,
in a task in which participants are required to discover the
law governing the motion of particles in an artificial
universe displayed on a computer screen (e.g., Mynatt,
Doherty, & Tweney, 1978).
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But do people confirm their hypotheses only in artificial
laboratory tasks? Perhaps they are better able to falsify in
real world contexts where they can access their knowledge
about the task? In fact, the tendency to confirm has been
observed in NASA Apollo mission scientists (Mitroff,
1974), and in the notes of scientists such as Alexander
Graham Bell (Gorman, 1995). It is possible that
confirmation is useful. For example, the participants who
successfully discovered the rule in the complex artificial
universe task tended to be those who confirmed their
hypotheses in the early stages of their attempted discovery
of the rule, and then tried to falsify when they had a well-
corroborated hypothesis (Mynatt et al., 1978). Perhaps it is
only when a hypothesis worth testing has been established
that it is necessary to attempt to falsify it. Confirmation and
falsification may be complementary strategies for successful
hypothesis testing.
 But it is also possible that people do not falsify because
they cannot (Poletiek, 1996). According to this view when
people generate a hypothesis it is their best guess about the
truth, and it does not make sense for them to try to show that
their best guess is wrong. In a version of the 2-4-6 task,
participants were encouraged to generate their best guess
about what the rule might be and then they were instructed
to perform falsifying tests on it. The instruction to falsify
decreased the number of positive triples, such as '10-12-14',
which is consistent with the best guess ‘even ascending
numbers’. The instruction to falsify also increased the
generation of negative test triples, such as '3-5-7' which is
inconsistent with the best guess ‘even ascending numbers’.
However, this test is only a falsifying one if the participant
expects the experimenter to say that the triple is consistent
with the real rule (and then the participant would know that
the hypothesis ‘even ascending numbers’ was wrong
because ascending odd numbers are consistent too). But if
the participant generates the inconsistent '3-5-7' triple and
expects the experimenter to say that it is not consistent with
the real rule, then they have attempted to confirm their
hypothesis (albeit with a negative triple). In fact,
participants generated triples that were inconsistent with
their hypothesis (negative triples) but they expected them to
be inconsistent with the experimenter’s rule. The
participants could not seem to make sense of the instruction
to falsify. The instruction to falsify may be impossible to
carry out (Poletiek, 1996).
 Given the ideas that confirmation is useful and falsification
is impossible, does it follow that the normative prescription
of falsification is flawed, rather than human rationality?
Perhaps, not. Even when a hypothesis is the best guess it is
not necessarily an accurate representation of the truth. We
turn to the case for falsification next.
Falsification and the Path to Truth
Consider the following example:
You are a scientist and your job is to identify the cause of
a dangerous new disease. You identify a previously
unrecognized virus in tissue samples of symptomatic
patients and your hypothesis is that this 'new virus' is the
cause of the disease. However, other scientists have
identified two viruses, including your new virus in their
tissue samples. They hypothesize that it is the 'other virus'
and not the new virus that is the cause. Both hypotheses
have confirming evidence. A case is reported where the
new virus is present and the other virus is absent. What
should you conclude?
A situation similar to this one faced scientists working on
the cause of the SARS epidemic. They concluded that the
'new virus' hypothesis was correct. The case where the
'other virus' was absent falsified the 'other virus' hypothesis
and corroborated the 'new virus' hypothesis. The example
illustrates how important falsification can be.
 There are many situations in which it is helpful to anticipate
the ways in which a hypothesis or plan could go wrong. For
example, it may be helpful to falsify in interactions with a
collaborator or opponent, whether in contexts such as
political or social engagement, or in games such as tic-tac-
toe or poker. The importance of considering what might go
wrong is observed in cases of military strategy, for example,
in Northern Ireland (Mallie, 2001). Attempts to falsify
hypotheses, particularly plans of action, could help reduce
costly mistakes.
 The merits of falsification are not lost on experts, as the
SARS example illustrates. It may even be the case that the
ability to falsify is part of what makes an expert (Cowley &
Byrne, 2004). The competitive nature of science may ensure
that different groups of scientists attempt to falsify their
opponent’s theories even if they only attempt to confirm
their own. The refutation of a theory is often discovered by
someone who did not invent the theory (Kuhn, 1996).
Hypothesis testing in scientific discovery may benefit from
a strategy of attempting to confirm a hypothesis until there
is sufficient corroboration for it to be considered seriously,
and then attempting to falsify it, just as in the ‘artificial
universe’ task (Mynatt et al., 1978). Perhaps more
importantly, experts may generate high quality hypotheses
from the outset. An exceptional scientist such as Alexander
Graham Bell may have tended to confirm rather than falsify
his hypotheses because his expertise ensured that his
hypotheses were exceptionally good (and there is a smaller
potential set of falsifying evidence for a good quality
hypothesis than for a poor one).
 As these observations suggest, a more systematic study of
expert hypothesis testing is warranted. We chose the game
of chess as our expert domain because it meets the essential
criteria: it is possible to identify a large sample of experts
whose expertise is objectively defined and categorised
relative to each other, and it is a task that draws directly on
participants’ expert knowledge and experience.
Chess and Hypothesis Testing
Studies of chess have contributed substantially to
understanding cognition, including problem solving (Newell
& Simon, 1972), chunking in working memory (Chase &
Simon, 1973), and expertise (De Groot, 1965). Findings
from research on chess have successfully explained
expertise in non-game domains such as physics (e.g.,
Larkin, McDermott, Simon, & Simon, 1980). Chess offers
great potential for an investigation of expert hypothesis
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testing. Of course, choosing a move in chess may depend on
a variety of processes including accessing a large repository
of chunked domain knowledge about possible opponent
moves (e.g., Chase & Simon, 1973; Gobet, 1998a). Our
suggestion is that hypothesis testing may be one of several
important processes for selecting a move in chess. We
expect that expert master players will be better than novices
at falsifying their planned moves by thinking about
opponent moves that could ruin their plan (for details see
Cowley & Byrne, 2004).
 Our key research question is, do experts and novices differ
in their ability to find refutations to lines of play in chess?
We conceptualize hypothesis falsification in chess as
finding opponent moves that refute the moves a player
examines for play. The opponent moves could ruin the
player’s plan and worsen the player’s position. We address
an important aspect of choosing a move that has never been
systematically investigated: the evaluation of move
sequences.
Hypothesis Testing in Chess
The overall goal of chess is to checkmate the opponent by
attacking the opponent king and eliminating all the possible
ways the opponent king can escape the attack. Chess
thinking may consist of exploring different alternative paths
in a ‘problem space’ (Newell and Simon, 1972). The
problem space consists of the initial problem state, that is,
the start of the game, intermediate problem states, for
example, capturing an opponent piece, and the end state
(checkmate). Progress from state to state is achieved
through operators, that is, in chess the way chess pieces are
allowed to move. For example, a bishop operates diagonally
backwards and forwards and captures on the square it lands
on for any one move.
 At the beginning of a game of chess the two players have
equal numbers of pieces and theoretically equal chances of
securing a win, loss or draw. To secure the best possible
result the players must play moves they hypothesize to be so
good that they cannot be refuted (Saariluoma, 1995).
Refutation (that is, hypothesis falsification) occurs when the
opponent plays a move that results in a worsening of the
player’s position. For example, a player may play a move
that he or she plans to be a good move, but the opponent
replies with a move that stops the player’s plan. The
opponent’s play worsens the player’s position and reduces
the player’s chance of a win.
 There may be three major processes in the choice of a chess
move: exploration, elaboration and proof (DeGroot, 1965).
Evidence of hypothesis testing is available in the proof
process. A chess player tests how good a move is by
mentally generating move sequences following on from that
move. For example, a move sequence might be: “If I move
my knight to that square, you might move your pawn to
attack my knight, and then I will have to retreat, and that is
really bad for me…”. In this example, the move sequence is
evaluated as leading to a negative outcome: a falsification
has been found for the knight move. Move sequences can be
evaluated as leading to either a positive, negative or neutral
outcome for a chess position. We conceptualize move
sequences that are judged to lead to a positive outcome as
akin to evidence confirming that a particular move is a good
move. Move sequences evaluated as leading to a negative
outcome are akin to evidence falsifying a move that was
thought initially to be a good move. Move sequences
evaluated as leading to a neutral outcome are neutral
evidence.
Accessing Hypothesis Testing in Chess
We carried out an experiment on hypothesis testing in chess
players (see Cowley & Byrne, 2004, for details). The 20
participants (19 men and 1 woman) were registered
members of the Irish Chess Union. The participants were
classified according to the Elo system, which calculates
expected playing strength value on the basis of tournament
and league results, and the value varies from approximately
1000 for an absolute novice and over 2800 for the world
champion. We tested experienced novices (mean rating of
1509) and experts (mean rating 2240). The expert group
included experts from different Elo categories of expertise,
including one grandmaster (Irish Elo >2500) two
international masters (Irish Elo > 2300), three Fide masters
(Irish Elo > 2200, i.e. International Chess Federation
masters), and four initial category experts (Irish Elo >
2000). All international class masters living in Ireland at the
time participated in the study (for further information on
participant details see Cowley & Byrne, 2004).
 We presented the participants with six board positions,
three normal and three random (as well as an initial practice
position). The board positions were chosen from games in
chess periodicals. They were middle game positions with
22-26 pieces to ensure complexity and to rule out the
chances that the masters’ had seen them before. Importantly,
they were ‘equality outcome’ positions, where there were
equal chances with best play for both black and white
pieces. This constraint ensured that there would be no
obvious confirming or falsifying move sequences. The
positions were chosen with the assistance of a chess expert
(who was not a participant in the study). See figure 1 for an
example of a chess position used.
Figure 1: Position 1 with white to play (and the co-ordinate
a1 is also illustrated in this diagram).
The participants’ task was to, “choose a move you would
play in the way you are used to going about choosing a
move in a real game”. They were given instructions to think
aloud, and their verbalizations were recorded by dictaphone.
It is instructive to focus on the master level players (for
a1
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comparison with masters studied in the chess literature
previously) and to this end we selected the think-aloud
protocols of five master level players (i.e. 1 Grandmaster, 2
International Masters, and 2 Fide International Chess
Federation Masters), and compared them to the think-aloud
protocols of five novice chess players, chosen at random
from the full sample of novices (for other analyses see
Cowley & Byrne, 2004).
 Moves examined by the player during think-aloud are
verbalized using algebraic chess notation, for example a
sequence of moves verbalized was: f5 exf5 gxf5 Bh5 Qg2
Rh4. This notation describes each piece and the location of
the square it will go to on the chess board. Each square on a
board has a location name called an algebraic coordinate.
The letters a-h are horizontally along the bottom of the
board. The numbers 1-8 are vertically up the board. Each
type of piece is given a letter in upper case format. Each
coordinate is given a letter in lower case format alongside a
number. So for example, the move ‘Ra1’ refers to a rook
piece (R) moving to the a1 square. Or, the rook could go to
the b1 square to the right of a1 (Rb1). A sequence of such
moves is a move sequence. All of the players were
sufficiently fluent with algebraic notation to be able to
‘think aloud’ using it. Three minutes thinking time was
allotted for choosing a move as it is just over the average
time per move in tournament play. Exposure for each board
position was timed using a standard tournament chess clock,
each clock was set at three minutes and when the clock’s
flag fell participants were told that their time was up.
 To accurately access hypothesis testing we also needed
participants to provide us with an evaluation of each move
sequence that they examined. However, spontaneous
evaluation in chess has a low probability of verbalization
(Newell & Simon, 1972). Accordingly we used a combined
methodology of think-aloud followed by retrospective
evaluation. Verbalized move sequences were recorded not
only by dictaphone but also by the experimenter (the first
author) in algebraic notation concurrent with think-aloud.
The experimenter asked the participants for their evaluation
of each move sequence, by first saying back the move
sequence immediately after each chess problem to reduce
retrospective error and interference (Ericsson & Simon,
1993). The participants were then asked to evaluate each
move sequence as having lead to a positive, negative or
neutral outcome for their positions.
Scoring confirming and falsifying hypothesis tests
The transcribed think-aloud protocols for the responses to
the normal board positions were segmented into episodes,
move by move. We constructed ‘problem behavior graphs’
(using Newell and Simon’s guidelines) for the responses to
the three normal board positions for each of the ten selected
participants (thirty problem behavior graphs in total). These
graphs plot each move sequence and its corresponding
retrospective evaluation. To illustrate we present in Figure 2
a small fragment of a master’s problem behaviour graph for
one board position.
Figure 2: A fragment of a problem behaviour graph
constructed from a chess master’s protocol.
Each line across represents a move sequence. The order of
search is from left to right, then down. Each circle (i.e.
node) represents a new position following a move made in
the problem space. For example, Qg2 means the player
thought aloud about the possibility of moving his queen to
the g2 square. Next the player thought aloud about a
possible reply from his opponent to his Qg2 move, that is,
the move Rxa3 where the opponent moves their rook to the
a3 square, and the x indicates that the rook captures a piece,
in this case a pawn. Next the player thought aloud about his
reply to this opponent’s move, that is, bxa3 where he would
move his pawn on the b file to a3 (pawn moves do not have
a P in front of them), and capture the opponent’s rook. The
plus sign shows that the player evaluated this move
sequence as positive for him. The next line sequence begins
with the player thinking about f5, that is, a pawn moves to
the f5 square. The next utterance the player makes is gxf5,
that is, the pawn on the g file of the board captures a pawn
on the square f5. This move is only possible for the player
and not his opponent. The player has generated a move
sequence that mentions only his own moves and does not
mention opponent moves. The dashed line captures these
skipped moves. The minus shows a negative evaluation.
Each problem behavior graph incorporates the think-aloud
move sequences with the retrospective evaluation (positive,
negative, or neutral).
 We used Fritz 8 (one of the most powerful current chess
programs) to obtain an objective evaluation of the chess
position that occurs at the final move of each sequence (i.e.
terminal node). For readers familiar with Fritz 8, we used
the infinite analysis module, in which each move sequence
is evaluated at least from 11ply from the terminal node (see
Chabris & Hearst, 2003). The evaluations provided by Fritz
8  enable us to identify move sequences that would
genuinely be positive or negative for a player. We could
distinguish between the move sequences that a player
indicated as leading to a positive outcome for their position
and that the program established would lead to a positive
outcome if played, from the move sequences that a player
identified as positive, but that the program established
would in fact lead to a negative outcome. We conceptualize
confirmation bias as a move sequence that a player
evaluates as leading to a positive outcome for them, when in
 Qg2         Rxa3        bxa3
 f5                            gxf5    
 Bc3
+
-
-
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fact it leads to a negative outcome. Likewise, we were able
to distinguish the move sequences that a player identified as
leading to a negative outcome and that the program
established would be negative if played, from move
sequences that the player identified as negative, but that the
program established were in fact positive for them. We
conceptualize falsification as a move sequence that a player
evaluates as leading to a negative outcome for them, when
in fact it leads to a negative outcome.
Hypotheses Testing in Chess Masters’ Thinking
Masters tended to think about 8 move sequences on average
for each board position, and experienced novices tended to
think about 6 move sequences. A total of 218 move
sequences were generated by the 10 players for the three
normal board positions (N = 122, M = 8.1 for each board
position for the masters, N= 96, M = 6.4 for novices).
 Four types of move sequences were identified from the
problem behaviour graphs. (1) 50% were complete move
sequences where every move for the player and his or her
opponent was articulated along the move sequence. (2) 25%
were skipped move sequences where an essential move was
not mentioned somewhere in the move sequence. (3) 19%
were base skip sequences where the first move or ‘base
move’ of the sequence was not mentioned. (4) 6% were
ambiguous move sequences where the move sequence could
not be interpreted. Only the complete move sequences lend
themselves to objective evaluation by Fritz 8, so we
concentrate our analysis here on these hypothesis tests (see
Cowley & Byrne, 2004 for further details).
 A complete move sequence is scored using the following
criteria: (a) whether it is predicted by the player to lead to a
positive, negative, or neutral outcome, and (b) whether it is
evaluated objectively by Fritz 8 as leading to a positive,
negative or neutral outcome. Thus there are nine possible
hypothesis tests for complete move sequences, as Table 1
illustrates. Confirmation bias corresponds to the '+/-' cell in
Table 1, and falsification corresponds to the '-/-' cell. These
two types of evaluation accounted for 42% of all
evaluations.
Table 1: Objective and subjective evaluations of move
sequences ('+' refers to a positive evaluation, '-' to a negative
one, '=' to a neutral one; '+/-' means the player’s evaluation
was positive and the program’s evaluation was negative).
Fritz 8’s evaluations
Positive negative neutral
Player’s evaluations
Positive +/+ +/- +/=
Negative -/+ -/- -/=
Neutral =/+ =/- =/=
Falsification In three of the cells of Table 1 (the three on
the diagonal from upper left to lower right), the subjective
evaluation of the player matches the objective evaluation of
the computer program. One of these matching cells is
particularly important for our prediction that experts falsify
more than novices: genuine falsification occurs in the
situation captured by the '-/-' cell in Table 1, in which the
player and the program both evaluated the outcome of the
move sequence as negative. Chess masters generated more
of these falsifying move sequences than novices (M = 3.2
for masters, M = 1.2 for novices) and this difference was
reliable (t (8) =2.02, p = .039).
 The result indicates that chess masters are capable of
falsifying their plans by identifying opponent moves that
would worsen the master’s position. People are able to
falsify (pace Poletiek, 2000). Domain expertise may
facilitate this falsification. Moreover, the moves chosen by
chess masters for play at the end of each of the three board
positions were evaluated by Fritz 8 as objectively better
moves than novices (the quality of moves is measured in
terms of ‘pawn advantage’ or ‘pawn disadvantage’, and it
was +0.309 pawn advantage for masters compared to –1.2
pawn disadvantage for experienced novices). The result is
consistent with the idea that the ability to falsify may
contribute to making better moves in chess.
Confirmation Bias Confirmation bias occurs when a move
sequence is evaluated subjectively by the participant as
leading to a positive outcome, but evaluated objectively by
the computer program as leading to a negative outcome (the
'+/-' cell in Table 1). The results show that novices
produced somewhat more instances of confirmation bias
than masters (M = 2.6 for novices and M = 1.6 for masters).
Although the difference was in the predicted direction it was
not reliable (t (8) = 1.443, p = .094).
Positive and Negative Testing The nine test types in Table
1 can be categorized into three groups: (1) Objective tests:
the player’s positive, negative and neutral evaluations
matched Fritz 8’s evaluations (the three cells on the
diagonal from upper left to lower right mentioned earlier),
and this category includes the falsification tests. (2) Positive
bias tests: the player’s evaluation was more positive than
Fritz 8’s. The three cells in this category include the second
and third cells in the first row ('+/-', '+/='), and the middle
cell in the third row ('=/-'), and this category includes the
confirmation bias tests. (3) Negative bias tests: the player’s
evaluation was more negative than Fritz 8’s. The three cells
in this category include the second and third cells in the first
column ('-/+', '=/+'), and the middle cell in the third column
('-/=').
 Chess masters generated reliably more objective tests than
novices (M = 6.6 for masters and M = 2.4 for novices).
Novices generated somewhat more positive bias tests than
the masters (M = 5 for novices and M = 3.4 for masters), but
the difference was not reliable. They generated a similar
amount of negative bias tests (M = 1.8 for masters, M = 1.2
for novices), as Figure 3 shows.
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Figure 3: The mean number of objective tests, positive bias
tests and negative bias tests generated by masters and
novices. (Instances of falsification and confirmation bias are
included in these categories).
Conclusions
People are capable of falsifying their hypotheses. Our
experimental results show that chess masters falsified their
hypotheses: they thought about how their opponent might
refute their plan in their move sequences. Chess masters
tended to evaluate their moves as good or bad for them more
realistically than experienced novices: their judgments
matched the objective evaluations of one of the most highly
advanced chess computer programs, Fritz 8. Experienced
novices exhibited something of a confirmation bias: they
tended to think about how their opponent would play moves
that fit in with their plan, somewhat more than chess masters
did. Novices, somewhat more than masters, tended to
evaluate their moves as better for them than they were
objectively. The evidence that chess masters can falsify
suggests that it may be premature to conclude that the
normative prescription of falsification is flawed. In this case
falsification can be considered a useful and rational strategy.
 Hypothesis testing may be influenced by domain expertise.
How does domain knowledge affect the ability to falsify by
chess experts? We plan to explore this question by
examining how masters test their hypotheses for random
board positions compared to novices. If falsification relies
on domain knowledge, then masters should tend not to
falsify their hypotheses about move sequences in the
random board positions as often as they do in the normal
board positions. Nonetheless, they may attempt to falsify
more than experienced novices, if their expertise has helped
them to develop a strategy of falsification in this domain.
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